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PERESTROIKA AND GLASNOST: WHERE WILL THEY LEAD?

An Individual Study Project

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by

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The implementation of perestroika and glasnost by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 initiated a series of events which has been affecting governments and people throughout much of the world. People have been watching the Soviet Union with renewed interest, and the scope and speed of actions taken by Mr. Gorbachev have generated questions such as: where will perestroika and glasnost lead?; what impact will there be and on whom?; what will be the results of these initiatives?; should the United States' military strategy be changed? This study reviews current U.S. military strategy, briefly describes the development and intended purposes of the Soviet programs, identifies achievements and impacts which have resulted, attempts to predict and analyze possible outcomes, determines effects on U.S. military strategy, and postulates required changes to U.S. military strategy.



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Perestroika and Glasnost: Where Will They Lead?

INTRODUCTION

Many factors affect U.S. military strategy. At the end of World War II when it was the sole possessor of the atom bomb, the U.S. nuclear strategy of massive retaliation protected its interests. With such a deterrent to further war, a large standing conventional force was no longer necessary, and it was consequently reduced. When technological advances enabled the Soviet Union to reach nuclear parity with the U.S. a few years later, another strategy was required. The new strategy of flexible response provided the country increased options to respond to threats by providing additional conventional and special warfare forces in its arsenal.

Mikhail S. Gorbachev's announcement of perestroika and glasnost at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee in April 1985 set into motion events which have captured the attention of people throughout the world. Four years ago, few would have thought the Soviet Union would propose such drastic unilateral cuts of military forces in Eastern Europe. And who could have imagined the degree of popularity the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has achieved? Unquestionably, initiatives taken by the General Secretary have affected people throughout the world, and the scope and speed with which he has been working lead to several important questions. What are the Soviets striving for? Where will perestroika and glasnost lead? What effects will be felt and by whom? What will be

the possible outcomes of their initiatives? Will they affect U.S. military strategy, and what changes will be required as a result?

It is my contention that the Soviet initiatives will indeed affect U.S. military strategy. However, the extent and timing of the effects are critical and must be considered carefully before altering the basis of the defense of the nation. Therefore, during the analysis, it is important that Soviet initiatives be properly differentiated between declaratory proposals and those which have actually been implemented.

The purpose of this study is to determine and analyze the possible outcomes of the two Soviet concepts, and to suggest changes in U.S. military strategy. These goals will be achieved by: reviewing current U.S. military strategy and the factors which affect strategy; examining the development of the two Soviet concepts; identifying achievements and impacts which have resulted; predicting possible outcomes which might result from the initiatives; determining effects on U.S. military strategy; and lastly, recommending changes to U.S. military strategy.

STRATEGY

President Reagan's 1988 historical summary of U.S. national strategy provides a good basis from which to begin a review of U.S. interests and strategies:

...Our strategy [derived from] the conviction that the United States' most basic national security interests would be endangered if a hostile state or group of states were to dominate the Eurasian landmass-- that area of the globe often referred to as the world's heartland. We fought two world wars to prevent this from occurring. ...the national strategy to achieve this objective has been containment..., and every Administration since World War II has endorsed the concept that the United States, in partnership with its allies, must prevent the Soviet Union from dominating those great concentrations of industrial power and human capacity that are Western Europe and East Asia. ... after World War II..., America deployed forces forward ...to help deter and contain Soviet military expansion. As Soviet capabilities grew, our security also required a large strategic nuclear force to augment the conventional deterrent.... The advent of nuclear weapons and intercontinental delivery systems added another dimension to our thinking about national security strategy: these weapons became the primary threat to our national survival. Thus, for over forty years, the deterrence of nuclear war and the reduction of its threat have been major objectives of U.S. National Security Strategy.¹

"The fundamentals of our strategy change little from year to year; our interests and objectives are derived from enduring values," the President stated² (see figure 1). Once established, it is the responsibility of national political leaders to determine how to achieve the objectives. This can be done through the application or threat of application of one or more of the country's four elements of national power. The elements, like the diverse number of instruments

available within each of those elements, can be used in conjunction with one another for greater effectiveness. Military power is just one power available to the nation. Military strategy, defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force³, is developed to support those national objectives. It consists of objectives (ends), military strategic concepts (ways), and military resources (means).

VALUES

Freedom

Human dignity

Happiness

Peace

Prosperity

INTERESTS

Survival as free nation

Healthy economy

Stable, secure world

Human freedom

Alliances

OBJECTIVES

Maintain security

Respond to global economics

Defend democracy

Resolve regional disputes

Build relationships

FIGURE 1. U.S. National Values, Interests, and Objectives

Our current military strategy, "seeks to deter war while maintaining a secure democratic environment within which the U.S., its allies, and its friends can pursue legitimate interests."⁴ The elements of the strategy, according to the Joint Staff are:

- nuclear deterrence supported by negotiated arms reductions and the investigation of defensive potential through the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI);

- strong alliances;
- forward deployed forces;
- a strong central reserve;
- force mobility;
- freedom of the seas, air and space;
- effective command and control;
- timely and accurate intelligence.

Colonel (Retired) Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. wrote that a number of factors affect military strategy (see figure 2). Because we live in a world of limitations and restrictions which cause us to do things other than we would like to do, the three components of military




Figure 2. Factors Affecting Military Strategy

strategy must be manipulated and massaged into an overall plan that best achieves the nation's objectives. Colonel Lykke states that when any of these basic components is incompatible with the others, our national security may be in danger.⁵

So how does perestroika and glasnost affect U.S. national military strategy? It is necessary to first examine the development of the Soviet concepts.

PERESTROIKA AND GLASNOST

Perestroika refers to a wide variety of changes determined necessary by the Soviet General Secretary to correct the unfavorable conditions and trends within the U.S.S.R. As Mr. Gorbachev said in his book on the subject, "Any delay in beginning perestroika could have led to an exacerbated internal situation in the near future, which, to put it bluntly, would have been fraught with serious social, economic and political crises."⁶ Though almost every facet of Soviet life was to be affected ultimately, the central problem which led to the concept was a stagnation of the economy. In the April 1985 speech, Gorbachev pointed out economic failures as well as a myriad of problems linked to the economy. Included were poor management, lack of direction by leaders, failure to use technology, acceptance of undeserved incentives, corruption, complacency by workers and managers, lack of responsibility, emphasis on quantity rather than quality of production, inefficient use of available raw materials, and a shortage of consumer goods and services.

To correct these problems, Gorbachev believed he had to initiate actions and programs to get the economy moving again while integrating modern technology and scientific methods. He needed to restructure the economic organization by decentralizing operations. But to do that, he felt compelled to get the masses of people oriented to a new way of thinking--a way in which the problems he saw throughout society could be reversed and put right again. He needed to instill

responsibility, encourage creativity and initiative, improve order and discipline, implement the principles of social justice, and have more glasnost or openness in the entire management network. He said that criticism and self-criticism were important aspects of glasnost and required if the country was to succeed in this vast endeavor. Along with the need to revitalize and reorganize the economy, he saw the need to change the moral and psychological failings in the society. Some personnel changes were necessary at all levels, and he began encouraging and motivating Soviet citizens to become more involved in what was going on. To rid society of its evils required leaders who would support his efforts and participation by the masses to prevent corruption and other social injustices from recurring. When asked what the final goals of perestroika were, Mr. Gorbachev responded,

We can hardly give a detailed, exact answer.... But in principle I can say that the end result of perestroika is clear to us. It is a thorough renewal of every aspect of Soviet life; it is giving socialism the most progressive forms of social organization; it is the fullest exposure of the humanistic nature of our social system in its crucial aspects- economic, social, political and moral.⁷

Glasnost was implemented because Gorbachev believed the human element was the most important part of the restructuring efforts and because

we want more openness about public affairs in every sphere of life. People should know what is good, and what is bad, too, in order to multiply the good and to combat the bad. That is how things should be under socialism.... glasnost ... makes it possible for people to understand better what happened to us in the past, what is taking place now, what we are striving for and what our plans are, and, on the basis of this understanding, to participate in the restructuring effort consciously.⁸

Gorbachev's hope was that involvement, or democratization, would thrive through glasnost and would result in the correction of some of the country's shortcomings and problems, particularly the reduction of mismanagement and corruption and the development of greater responsibility in people.

Much has been done. According to a 1987 Gorbachev report

many things are unusual in our country now: election of managers at offices and enterprises; multiple candidates for elections to Soviets in some districts; joint ventures with foreign firms; self-financed factories and plants, state and collective farms; the lifting of restrictions on farms producing food products for enterprises and run by them; wider cooperative activities; encouragement of individual enterprise in small scale production and trade; and closure of non-paying plants and factories operating at a loss; and of research institutes and higher educational establishments working inefficiently. A press that is more incisive, taking up 'taboos,' printing a rich variety of public points of view, and conducting an open polemic on all vital issues concerning our progress and perestroika

Some personnel changes were required to get the support he needed for his programs, and since then other important initiatives have also been taken.

With these beginnings, Mr. Gorbachev's initiatives to restructure the economy and reverse social injustices within the Soviet Union have taken directions the results of which remain uncertain. His new thinking at the international level brought him to the conclusion that the current world is a complex, more interdependent one in which the arms race and nuclear war are unwinnable and a better understanding is required between leaders. To reduce tensions, he set out on a determined path towards disarmament and suggested that the time had

come when it is sufficient to have arms only for defensive purposes. Mr. Gorbachev attempted to "...shape and strengthen civilized international relations so essential to the modern world" by meeting with world leaders to discuss matters of importance, and by 1987 he had conducted over 150 such meetings.¹⁰ Mr. Gorbachev's style of diplomacy has been dynamic, with a charismatic appeal which contrasts significantly with previous Soviet leaders. The promotion of continued East-West dialogue and understanding and the achievement of international stability, so he can focus on domestic programs, appear to be the order of the day.

Are Gorbachev and his policies of, or derived from, perestroika and glasnost on track? Even the hardline skeptic, aware of the norm for Soviet rhetoric of the past, must concede that progress has been made in some areas. On the other hand, many goals associated with the two concepts have not been met. Some are underway, and some have made no progress at all. Regardless of their particular status, there have been impacts on people from each of the initiatives. Those impacts may affect U.S. interests and military strategy.

ACHIEVEMENTS AND IMPACTS

What has been achieved from the Gorbachev initiatives? Is Gorbachev adhering to his plan? Andre Sakharov said Gorbachev "was pursuing democratic reforms through 'undemocratic means'...., leading by 'improvisation.'"11 Gorbachev stated that although he is following a plan prepared before he took office, he admitted he does not have all the answers and is learning along the way. Regardless of how it is being done, following a plan or not, many changes have been implemented or declared. As will be seen, some have been more successful than others.

Though more aware of his environment, the Soviet consumer has seen little change in his or her quality of life. Shortages of basic consumer goods still exist, and in some cases prices have risen with no change in quality. An attempt at encouraging entrepreneurship has not been totally successful either. Some who have tried this "capitalistic" idea have been repudiated by other citizens not accustomed to market economics. Although the election of business managers by the workers and whistleblowing under the name of glasnost have been occurring, the bureaucratic tendencies embedded in the Soviet infrastructure have changed little. Some believe it is almost impossible to change the work culture that has been a part of the system for so long. Many are content with being cared for and working little, and many are complacent and comfortable with the corruption which occurs. Greater openness has made citizens more aware of their surroundings, such as the enormous environmental problems plaguing the country as a result of industrial pollution, and the poor quality of building construction and inefficient public services noted during

the December 1988 earthquake relief efforts in Armenia. However, Mr. Gorbachev has shown no less efforts in his attempts to reform and get people involved in improving the system.

On the international level, several Western countries (including West Germany, Italy, Britain, France and Japan) granted loans or offered credit lines for trade to the Soviet Union in excess of \$9 billion (more than the amount loaned between 1985 and 1987)¹², and business relations with China and South Korea are underway despite ideological and political differences.

Though official government positions have been slow in development, there is one school of thought that believes a greater interdependence could result from business dealings and lead to greater international stability as well as improvements in the quality of life for Soviet citizens. On the other hand, there is concern that traditional alliance relationships will be stressed as nations seek economic opportunities. Though some believe greater interdependence will result in increased stability, Richard Pipes believes the opposite will occur. Joseph Nye quoted him as saying

such changes for the better that one can expect in the nature of the Soviet government and in its conduct of foreign relations will come about only from failures, instabilities and fears of collapse and not from a growing confidence and sense of security.¹³

Associated with the increased business relations is the possible transfer of technology with military potential from Western nations, such as the recent transfer by West Germans to Libya which resulted in a capability to produce chemical munitions. There is a fear that the West could finance the Soviet military, and international business

deals could degrade established alliances. It has been proposed that NATO develop an economic strategy and that rules be established for dealing with potential adversaries. The Soviets have also announced a reduction in military spending to shift money toward the domestic and economic sectors of the country. This announcement was welcomed by the West since it could lead to a less threatening international environment.

Mr. Gorbachev's aggressive agenda, personable attitude and innovative initiatives in foreign affairs have established him as a world leader, reaffirming that the Soviet Union is a global power politically and militarily if not economically. The General Secretary met President Reagan for four summit meetings, and Mr. Gorbachev expressed his desire to meet with President Bush as soon after the inauguration as possible. He recently met with Chancellor Kohl of West Germany, and a trip to China is planned in May.

His strengthened relations with many nations, along with his penchant for open dialogue on important global issues, have achieved success in the international arena. Many speak of "peace breaking out all over" as a result of his foreign relations efforts. The withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and possibly Cam Ranh Bay, along with the progress made with China on border talks, the reduction of human rights abuses, and the proposal to unilaterally reduce troops in Eastern Europe have supported this impression. Such progress shows promise for reduced tensions and greater world stability, which Gorbachev needs if he is to concentrate his efforts on domestic reform.

The idea of a reduced Soviet threat comes at a time when the U.S. and its allies face some potentially critical decisions in areas such as defense spending, burdensharing, nuclear and conventional force modernization, and basing rights. Cautious observers are not yet ready to conclude that the world is more secure. Regardless, it is clear that Soviet initiatives have convinced many that future political dealings may not be "business as usual," particularly in Europe. For the U.S. to do nothing might cause it to become the odd man out as nations re-evaluate what is important to them and how best to serve their national interests. Conversely, to act too quickly without the benefit of careful thought might do more harm than good.

As with economics, it appears that Mr. Gorbachev's political efforts have shown more progress in the international arena than at home. Changes in leadership appointments and in the political structure enabled him to consolidate greater power for himself while keeping his opponents at arm's length, too weak to challenge him seriously. While many see his efforts as being for the good of many, others see him consolidating too much power--power that could return the country to Stalinism. Those who oppose his reform initiatives include complacent bureaucrats who benefit from the current system through corruption, false reporting and other unethical means. From Gorbachev's desire for citizens to experience more democracy has evolved liberal and nationalist movements in both the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. People seeking independence from the domination of the Soviet Communist Party have also made themselves heard. The Baltic states proposed laws which would give them sovereignty over

their own country. When the Soviets feared loss of control, the movements were curtailed by the authorities. Long lived discontent between the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis led to open uprisings and unrest which were answered by Soviet troops to contain the violence which occurred. Now that the people have tasted democracy and freedom, their expectations may be greater than before.

The policy of glasnost has permitted outsiders to learn more about the Soviets than ever before. Reports from the Soviet Union continue to interest and inform Americans. Reports have included almost every area of Soviet life, lessening the distorted views previously held by many. Naturally, some are guarded and cautious of some of the reports. Soviet citizens, too, have been affected by the openness. Criticism has been expressed by individuals such as Sakharov, and it has been reflected in movies, meetings and the press. The Soviets have had a taste of freedom for perhaps the first time. Although criticism, liberalization and more democratization were things Gorbachev sought in his policies, he demonstrated there are limits to that which is permitted.

Gorbachev's actions and speeches also have many people wondering if the Communist leader has begun a shift from the traditional Marxist-Lenninist ideology to a more capitalist one. Based on a recent speech where the Communist leader noted the old ways may not be appropriate to achieve desired economic goals, some political analysts concluded the General Secretary had decided to resort to capitalist methods to overcome its current economic difficulties. Others would argue that the communist system has always been vague enough to allow procedural

latitude while retaining the ultimate goal of total Communism. One thing is for certain: many are wondering what all this means and what might result.

Human rights abuses have decreased in recent months with Soviet permission for foreigners to visit prison camps, release of many political prisoners, and acknowledgement of dissidence in various ways. Human rights, always of interest to the U.S., have improved so much that Great Britain and America now support the Soviet proposal to host an international conference on human rights in 1991.

Significant military achievements have been realized, and the stage has been set for others. Thus far, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty signed by Gorbachev and Reagan in 1987 "represents the first negotiated reversal of Soviet military buildup of nuclear weapons, and thus offers grounds for hope that we can achieve greater security and a more stable East-West relationship at a lower level of armaments."¹⁴ Though the treaty has some positive aspects, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe expressed concern "that the agreement might breed a sense of euphoria that could lead to further denuclearization of Europe or to failure by the NATO nations to continue with the planned modernization of the alliance's military forces."¹⁵ The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, according to the Soviets' stated plan, was seen as another visible sign that tends to foster stability and trust. By adhering to the withdrawal plan, the Soviets provided a clear example they can be trusted to do what they say. Of course, they also reduced the burden of "their Vietnam" and now will be able to reduce military spending

and concentrate on domestic issues. Will the Soviets also withdraw from Cam Rahn Bay? That remains to be seen, just as with other declarations made by the Soviet leader.

To date, there has been no evidence which supports the stated shift to a defensive strategy based on reasonable sufficiency nor a unilateral reduction of troops and equipment from East Europe. Though the announcements were welcomed in the West, Marshal Akhromeyev (the Soviet Armed Forces Chief of Staff who had publicly rejected such a move) coincidentally retired for health reasons immediately afterwards. Some Western analysts suspected he resigned due to loss of credibility with his senior officers by failing to ward off the cuts.¹⁶ Though there has been no proof of a change to a defensive strategy, this shift is not easily accomplished and could take time to prepare the implementing doctrine.

The best indicator of a defensively oriented Warsaw Pact force would probably be the withdrawal of forces from Eastern Europe. As yet, no changes have occurred, though Mr. Gorbachev's speech to the United Nations announced such cuts and included a plan to reorganize units to make them clearly defensive. In the past, it was easily said that the Soviets have a history of doing other than what they say. Is this still true? The force reduction plan, if implemented, could reduce East-West tensions, but could also place pressure on the U.S. and NATO for a like response. The U.S. Congress, already under pressure to reduce the nation's budget deficit, will be tempted to cut defense spending by possibly reducing U.S. conventional forces in Europe.

POSSIBLE OUTCOMES

Mr. Gorbachev's initial programs have had both direct and second order effects. Additionally, continued adjustments to previous initiatives as well as new initiatives are being signalled. Though too soon to say what might occur, there are a number of possibilities.

No one is yet able to determine the effectiveness of Gorbachev's economic reforms. Results of the last four years lead to the conclusion that unless some dramatic unforeseen change occurs, the economy will see little improvement for some time. Though the Soviet consumer has seen a decline in the availability of some goods and services, he/she is accustomed to a low standard of living and such dissatisfaction presents only a remote threat to the leadership. Though some decentralization has been accomplished in the workplace, too much of a shift to a market economy could present risks to the Party's absolute power, and Gorbachev will not risk that.

It is the external economic policies which would probably have the largest effect on U.S. military strategy. In the process of obtaining capital and technology to modernize Soviet production capabilities and revitalize the economy, there will undoubtedly be a greater economic interdependence between the Soviet Union and those Western nations looking for expanded business opportunities and markets. While this relationship holds promise for greater international stability due to a shift in emphasis from military programs to trade or economic considerations, it will also present new challenges for the West regarding security alliances and technology transfers.

Cuts in Soviet defense spending and shifts of funds to domestic needs will also present a less threatening situation for the West and for East Asian countries such as China and Japan. Analysts report that "by 2010, the Soviet Union will probably have the world's fourth largest gross national product, following that of the United States, China and Japan. Currently the Soviet economy is the third largest, slightly behind that of Japan...."17

Three possible outcomes have been suggested for Gorbachev's political system: greater liberalism, a return to Stalinist-type austerity, or more of the same "muddling through." Thus far, there has been no evidence to indicate any changes to the Soviets' long-term objectives of spreading communism throughout the world, retaining their role as the dominant communist state, and reducing U.S. influence. It is likely that Gorbachev, in his quest to gain time to repair his economy, will take advantage of the vagueness of the Marxist-Leninist ideology to take whatever actions he believes necessary to succeed (He has stated the path is not always direct). Greater liberalism and democratization at the lower levels of government are likely to continue and could produce several possibilities. If Gorbachev compromises with the nationalist movements, he risks losing control of areas which provide security and economic benefits to the Soviet Union. Unchecked discontent could lead to disintegration of a functional government and Gorbachev's downfall. Or, the Soviet Union could take a hardline approach and continue using armed forces to control unrest which will keep tensions high and do little for Soviet human rights at a time when the subject

is so important. The U.S. endorsement of the Soviets' proposal to host a human rights conference is an indication of American acknowledgement of changes in the Soviets' dealings with dissidents and concern for improving their human rights image. An acceptable reduction in central authority may become necessary to placate political opponents, nationalist movements in East European and the Baltic states, and ethnic unrest which will probably continue as a result of glasnost and economics. Unresolved economic difficulties could lead to power struggles, leadership changes and political disarray, but that possibility appears remote for some time. A recent poll showed a majority of Muscovites thought the country was heading in the right direction, and as addressed earlier, Gorbachev's appeal and popular support make him a formidable politician.

At the international level, diplomacy has become an effective instrument of power for Gorbachev. To achieve and maintain international stability requires that he continue pursuing an aggressive, open dialogue with world leaders, using negotiations, bilateral agreements, arms control, cultural exchanges, non-violent military means, and reductions in human rights abuses as key policy instruments. However, the U.S. and its allies, particularly members of NATO, could face new challenges and potential disharmony as the Soviet Union strives to achieve its goals and interests through bilateral negotiations and trade agreements. A weakened alliance could result if consensus cannot be obtained on the tough issues of defense, nuclear weapons, trade, and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

What possible outcomes will result from Gorbachev's defense initiatives? In all likelihood, nuclear arms reduction negotiations will continue, with both the U.S. and the Soviet Union attempting to restrict the spread of these weapons to Third World and developing countries. As the world becomes more multipolar and interdependent, the danger of the spread and use of these weapons will increase. Gorbachev has voiced a genuine concern for the elimination of these weapons and will pursue efforts to prevent a nuclear war. However, the probability is high that nuclear weapons will remain the primary weapon of mass destruction and the cornerstone of deterrence at least until new technology replaces them with other advanced, more efficient weapons.

It is possible and also likely that Gorbachev will reduce the size of his conventional forces, reorganize them into more defensive oriented units, and give other evidence of a new defensive strategy. He has more to gain than to lose from these changes. By following the course he announced, he will reap benefits in every sphere of national power: economically, politically, ideologically and militarily. Reductions would decrease requirements for military spending, allowing more money to be shifted to domestic needs. He would gain popular support at home and in foreign circles. He would demonstrate leadership and resolve to communist countries, particularly China, which would be less threatened along the common border. Furthermore, he would tempt Western nations to re-evaluate the threat and possibly alter their planned courses of action vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

A reduced military threat in Europe would provide a number of possibilities for the U.S. Congress, including cutting military spending, delaying force modernization programs, and reducing the number of forces that are forward deployed. Of course, this may not happen if the Warsaw Pact forces which remain after the announced cuts are still a numerically superior force. In East Asia, it is possible, but not likely, that a reduction of a Soviet threat to China could turn the Chinese into more of a security threat to the West. Principally, ideological differences with the Soviet Union and established Chinese ties with the West will more than likely prevent China from becoming a major military threat to the West.

Other possibilities which might occur if the Soviets reduce their conventional forces directly affect West Germany. Coupled with Gorbachev's possible economic and political initiatives, West Germany could come under a tremendous amount of pressure from anti-nuclear activists to denuclearize the country or delay existing plans to modernize short range tactical nuclear weapons (Chancellor Kohl has already felt the pressure regarding the latter). Political activists could place pressure on the country to become neutral regarding the superpower struggle, perhaps withdrawing from the NATO alliance and removing U.S. forces from German territory. Germany is considered to be the key to the continuation of the Atlantic alliance. Another possibility is that Gorbachev's initiatives could lure the West Germans into reunification of the two Germanies, which would also result in the ouster of the U.S. and the likely dissolution of NATO.

However, NATO will in all likelihood remain intact and continue its security role in West Europe as it has for the past forty-odd years. The challenges ahead, however, will require strong U.S. leadership, increased negotiations and perhaps unprecedented concessions by its members. Burdensharing will continue to be a topic of debate within the NATO community as leaders reduce military spending to match the reduced threat after the reduction of the Warsaw Pact forces.

The pursuit and development of new technologies and space related defense activities will probably continue to be pursued by both the Soviet Union and the West for fear that the other side will get too far ahead. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union are currently writing about the possible impacts new technologies may have for the future. Therefore, the Administration's plan to continue research and development of the Strategic Defense Initiative is likely to occur due to its potential offensive and defensive uses. However, this subject will be debated heatedly in Congress and in the media. Limiting U.S. SDI research and development might give the Soviets a far greater lead in that important area.

As has been shown, every factor in the formulation of military strategy (except ethics) Colonel Lykke identified could possibly affect the objectives, ways or means of providing security for the U.S. But is it necessary to alter existing military strategy? Have perestroika and glasnost actually caused that many meaningful changes? Perhaps not, but it is certainly constructive to be concerned about the future and what might occur in order to integrate military

strategy with the other elements of power to form an appropriate national strategy. The task now is to recommend changes to the current U.S. military strategy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

So what should the U.S. do? Seweryn Bialer said conditions are right to influence Soviet behavior to the extent that behavior can be influenced by outsiders. Western instruments for influencing change in the Soviet Union fall into three categories: economic, political and cultural.¹⁸ Jerry F. Hough suggested the U.S. maintain policies of recent decades with greater flexibility and a gradual increase in trade.¹⁹ William G. Hyland said U.S. strategy must make the Soviet Union pay a price for the interlude it requires to improve the Soviet economy--a price in strategic stability and in resolving regional conflicts. To accomplish this, Western alliances must be preserved and negotiations conducted with the Soviets. Hyland suggested "political dialogue be ... institutionalized" and that the U.S. develop clear policies that include "no transfer of high technology."²⁰ Richard Pipes said "NATO should be complemented by an economic alliance...to regulate technology and credits to the Communist bloc."²¹ Joseph Nye concluded that "deliberate efforts to support Gorbachev could have adverse unintended consequences."²² He suggested political summits, balanced arms control agreements, increased trade and admission of the Soviet Union into international economic institutions would help Gorbachev's domestic policies without hurting his legitimacy in the eyes of his internal constituencies. William H. Luers agreed with Nye to a large degree but also suggested the U.S. "downplay the concept of 'linkages,' maintain regular

discussions on regional and bilateral issues,²³ promote the yearning for national identity²⁴ by Warsaw Pact states, and plan for the long term.

Graham Allison believed Gorbachev's reforms and policy adjustments have produced significant opportunities for the West--opportunities which should not be overlooked. He argued that

Washington should take the lead in formulating an aggressive Western diplomatic agenda aimed at testing Gorbachev at his word. The challenge is to formulate equally far-reaching proposals for Soviet actions that advance Western interests through propositions that Gorbachev cannot refuse--if he means what he says.²⁵

Specific proposals offered by Allison include: elimination of all nuclear weapons capable of a first strike; arms control agreements that reduce the Warsaw Pact's capabilities for surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations; establish measures that create tripwires the Soviet Union would have to cross to prepare to go to war, such as international inspectors at militarily important locations, constraints on forward deployment of tanks, artillery, bridging and mine-laying equipment, and advance schedules for force mobilization; in conjunction with Central American presidents, cease all military aid to the Sandinistas and the Contras, together with guarantees that the Nicaraguan government cease all material support for insurgency movements; treat the Soviet Union economically as we do China and some East European countries, including incentives to adopt a price system that would make it possible for the Soviets to eventually join international financial institutions. Allison

acknowledged there are risks associated with such a strategy: premature proclamation that peace has broken out, and the entanglement of the West with the Soviet Union in the web of interdependence. He concluded that the "U.S. and its allies must reach beyond containment to aggressive engagement of the Soviet Union in ways that encourage Gorbachev's reformist instincts to restructure Soviet external relations and internal institutions."²⁶ Brent Scowcroft, President Bush's national security advisor, tended to agree with Allison. Scowcroft indicated we should "encourage Gorbachev to go even farther in reducing Soviet military forces."²⁷ Former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, however, said now is not the time to change U.S. defense policy.²⁸

What is the correct military strategy? That is difficult to say. However, based on the preceeding analysis, the following recommendations are offered.

The first element of the current military strategy, nuclear deterrence supported by negotiated arms reductions and the investigation of the defensive potential of SDI, is sound and requires no change. It relies on the ability of the U.S. and its allies to deter aggression and prevent coercion of the U.S. America and its allies emphasize both the resolve and ability to respond to aggression through a strategic doctrine of flexible response, which is currently the foundation of both the U.S. and NATO strategy. As long as the alliance remains strong and oriented toward collective security, the deterrence value is present. The U.S. and its allies possess a triad

of strategic nuclear weapons sufficient to deter war. The buildup of weapons during this period has increased to alarming and dangerous levels, and reduction of nuclear weapons has become a concern for both East and West. The INF Treaty was a landmark achievement in reducing this level. Continued emphasis on the elimination of nuclear weapons is desirable. As for SDI, debate continues as to its feasibility and affordability. President Bush said he will continue research on this project, but economic reality indicates it will be a long time before development and production occur.

U.S. military strategy continues to be based on strong alliances, the second element. The combination of nuclear and nonnuclear U.S. and allied forces has proven successful over time. Most agree that alliances remain a necessity, but most also agree that some changes are required in the way business is done. The "West needs a general strategy that recognizes there are indeed domestic changes underway, but one that tempers that recognition with a hardheaded assertion of Western security requirements."²⁹ Bialer said recognition and acceptance of the differences between American and European approaches to the Soviet Union, particularly in East-West economic relations, are required. He called for a united Western position on arms control issues, on the deployment of conventional forces in Europe, and in opposition to Soviet expansionism. Additionally, "the transfer to the Soviet Union of technology with probable military applications cannot be tolerated."³⁰ Hyland said an alliance policy must recognize that containment and coexistence are desired by our allies. General Galvin warned that "we should be careful not to equate ...Soviet domestic

reorganization with a change in the Soviet military institution--or with a true diminution of Soviet foreign policy goals."³¹ In other words, the Warsaw Pact remains a military threat as the Soviets pursue domestic change. For collective security to remain strong, diplomacy with understanding and caution will be required. Again, there is no reason to change current strategy.

With the reduction of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe, greater importance has been shifted to conventional forces. The Soviet economy is driving the Soviet Union to a smaller, more defensively oriented force structure.³² The third element of military strategy is forward deployed forces, a tangible, visible sign to the allies of U.S. commitment to the defense of freedom and preservation of security. No change in this element is required. While the majority of forward deployed U.S. forces are stationed in Europe, others are in South Korea and the Persian Gulf. Again, calls for reduced military spending and the euphoria of a reduced threat from the Soviet Union increase the possibility of cutting back the number of forward deployed forces. Interestingly, a recent German public opinion poll indicated a perception that the U.S. and Soviet Union provided equal risks to West Germans.³³ However, Senator Gore said the Soviets should reduce their conventional forces even more than what has been declared to reinforce the existing U.S. policy of forward deployed forces and flexible response.³⁴ General Rogers said to withdraw conventional forces allows the Soviets to achieve their objectives.³⁵ While some believe Europe wants to become more self-reliant and nothing would encourage the Soviet Union more than

for the U.S. to withdraw from Europe, the chances of withdrawal are minimal.

The next three elements of military strategy are similar in that they are affected by fewer factors than the previous ones. Strong central reserves, force mobility, and effective command and control are largely dependent upon affordability and national policies. Commitments to allies require military forces based in the continental U.S. to be ready to reinforce forward deployed forces if necessary or to respond to other areas of the world as needed. This reserve is required to help deter aggression and fight if deterrence fails. Therefore, units and personnel should be equipped and trained to accomplish assigned missions. The U.S. must sustain these forces if they are to support the warfighting commanders' warplans and contingency plans. The ability to project a force into an area requires transportation. Again, the amount of transportation assets available at a given time is largely a function of affordability. As the perceived threat is decreased, the need for force mobility and a strong central reserve is decreased. In the past, as military spending diminished, changes in the amount of training which could be funded occurred rather than changing structure or organization. There is no change in this pattern for the foreseeable future. Some degree of risk is accepted since the objectives, ways and means are not equally balanced.

The last two elements of military strategy (freedom of the seas, air and space; and timely and accurate intelligence) are predominantly affected by the politics, economics and technology associated with the

availability of naval and air bases and communications facilities in foreign territories. With continued alliances, effective diplomacy, proper funding and technological advances, no foreseeable change would demand a shift in strategy.

Though no changes are deemed necessary for current U.S. military strategy, other recommendations are submitted. Generally speaking, whatever is done should be done with caution and deliberate thought. The stakes are much too high to come to quick, ill-conceived conclusions based on the recent popular phrase that "peace is breaking out all over" and the unilateral military reductions Mr. Gorbachev announced at the UN. The U.S. must keep in mind that the ultimate goal of the Soviets is to spread communism throughout the world. While the U.S. should take advantage of the opportunities being presented by the Soviet leadership during this period of unique actions, it must be remembered that the cold war is still on. Some specific actions the U.S. should take are:

(1) Marginally help the Soviets economically. Gorbachev's recent announcement of unilateral military reductions is indicative of his need to reduce military spending and shift funds and emphasis to industry and the ailing economy. However, Soviet history and culture demand a strong military to prevent successful foreign attack on Soviets or its soil. The amount and type of trade allowed between the U.S. and the Soviets should be regulated to prevent involvement contrary to U.S. interests. NATO member trade agreements should prevent Western financing of the Soviet military and weakening of the security alliance. Link U.S. and Western economic assistance to the

reduction of Soviet military forces and spending, as Richard Perle suggested in his recent U.S. News and World Report article.³⁶

(2) Continue periodic, open dialogues with the leader of the Soviet Union, but only when meaningful results can be achieved. Mr. Bush should arrange his long-term goals and objectives and meet with Gorbachev when there is a chance for progress.

(3) Continue seeking evidence of changes in Soviet positions on human rights, military strategies, and glasnost, remembering the strength of Soviet propaganda. The past four years have been replete with well-meaning proposals by the Soviets, but little actual change has occurred other than the significant events pertaining to the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and the agreement on intermediate range nuclear force reductions.

(4) Be prepared to seek opportunities to cultivate relationships with those Soviet satellite countries aspiring for freedom and democracy. At the same time, the U.S. should refrain from outright interference. This promises to be a very delicate situation which will probably yield initial results through a more open system of international trade and progress in human rights. U.S. humanitarian assistance to the Armenian recovery efforts from the recent catastrophic earthquake is indicative of the type of actions which should pay dividends for the West in the long term.

On a broader scale, the establishment of a clearly formulated national strategy is required during this period of competing demands, limited resources, and closer relationships between economic, political, socio-psychological and military elements of national

power. As the Soviets proceed to initiate actions which will undoubtedly be in their best interest, it almost goes without saying that U.S. domestic and foreign policy objectives must be clearly in America's best interest if it is to remain the world's leader of democracy and freedom. Additionally, and almost as important, the interests of the U.S. and those of its allies require careful and frequent review to ensure that traditional and necessary alliances are maintained in the fight against communism. National leaders with clear foresight and abilities to establish difficult priorities, defeat parochial bureaucracies, and gain consensus both at the national and international levels will be required to make tough choices and negotiate wisely as Soviet initiatives affect U.S. military strategy.

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